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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)**



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## DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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## VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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
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**VIETNAM  
AND  
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**



Developments in South Vietnam

(S) [ ] The enemy may be moving some forces from Khe Sanh to Hue and may be preparing to interdict Route 1 between there and Quang Tri City. US and ARVN infantry forces conducting an offensive sweep around Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province have made contact with an estimated battalion of the enemy. The numerous messages sent by Communist units in 3d Corps may presage increased activity there, but any actions aimed at Saigon will probably be postponed until after Allied offensive operations around the capital end. In the Delta, large enemy units are reported near the towns of My Tho and Cai Lay on Route 4 in Dinh Tuong Province.

Contact With Enemy Forces Continues in 1st Corps

(C) While contacts with the enemy have subsided somewhat in the southern portion of the country, US forces in northern 1st Corps continued to make contact. Several engagements were reported on 20 March ranging from just south of the DMZ to an area north of Sam Ky in Quang Tin Province. The combined actions left 120 of the enemy dead; 13 sampans were also destroyed in the fighting. Allied losses were light.

Possible Enemy Movement From Khe Sanh to Hue

(S) [ ] New developments support previous indications that the 95C NVA Regiment and the 101D NVA Regiment, 325C Division, might be moving from Khe Sanh to Hue.

(S) [ ] Sec. 3.3(b) (1) the 101D has joined the 95C in an area 18 miles west-southwest of Khe Sanh near Route 92, which runs to the A Shau Valley. Two AA units that have been located in the vicinity of these two regiments may be providing their air defense. Moreover, a sharp increase in communications between enemy units in the Hue and Khe Sanh areas and higher headquarters in North Vietnam may reflect coordination for a movement toward Hue.

(Continued)



Although the shift of the two regiments away from Khe Sanh could be a temporary relocation to avoid B-52 strikes, the evidence favors their reassignment to the Hue area.

(S) In the A Shau Valley, a rise in enemy activity is suggested by indications of the arrival of an NVA Artillery regiment, possibly the 45th, and several enemy tanks. (See page A-8.)

#### Activity Around Quang Tri City

(S) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) an attempt by the 812th NVA Regiment to cut Route 1 between Quang Tri City and Hue. Such an operation could precede an attack on Quang Tri City and would in any case help restrict shifts of friendly troops between Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces.

#### Possible Infiltration Corridor for VC/NVA Forces in Quang Tri Province

(S) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) a possible infiltration corridor is being utilized for the movement of men and supplies to and from the DMZ and Base Area 101. During the past month, Sec. 3.3(b) (1); Sec. 3.3(b) (6) these unidentified groups have been moving through a five-mile-wide corridor extending from an area northwest of Dong Ha south to the Thua Thien Province border. The route passes east of Cam Lo and west of Dong Ha south past Ba Long. The possible "staging/receiving" area in the DMZ area is located approximately six miles northwest of Dong Ha at a point where this infiltration corridor is believed to begin. The daily north-south movement of unidentified VC/NVA entities in this area may indicate the shifting of men or supplies to and from the DMZ and Base Area 101.

#### Activity Around Ban Me Thuot

(S) (b) (3), (b) (7)(C) In Darlac Province about 10 miles north-northwest of Ban Me Thuot, US and ARVN infantry units conducting a sweep gained contact with an estimated battalion, probably from the 32d NVA Regiment, on 20 March. The enemy force

(Continued)

tried to withdraw to the north but was blocked by friendly reinforcements. Pressure on the enemy is being maintained from three directions. This engagement, the arrival of three additional South Vietnamese companies in Ban Me Thuot, Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Hq, 33d NVA Regiment, has moved away from the town may indicate that the recent threat to the city has diminished.

#### Message Volume Suggests Future Activity in Saigon Area

Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) Sec. 3.3(b) (1) the Communists plan to step up their activity. It seems likely that any projected action in the Saigon area would await the end of Allied Operation QUYET THANG and be directed at the main lines of communication around the city. Harassment and sapper attacks on the capital remain within the enemy's capability, of course, and would have an adverse effect on the already uneasy population.

#### Hau Nghia Engagement

A Communist unit, located approximately six miles northeast of Bao Trai in Hau Nghia Province, yesterday failed to escape a sweep of Allied forces in the area. US and ARVN troops engaged what was estimated to be a battalion-sized force and killed 142 of the enemy in a battle that raged for eight hours. It was a lopsided victory for the Allies who lost only eight killed and 21 wounded.


#### Enemy Threat to Dinh Tuong Towns

Sec. 3.3 (b) (1) Large Viet Cong units are now deployed near two major population centers along Route 4 in Dinh Tuong Province. The 514th Local Force Battalion is north of Cai Lay, and both battalions of the DT 1 Regiment have been contacted northeast of My Tho. ARVN forces, under recently appointed 4th Corps Commander Gen Thang, have been making a determined effort to establish control of the rural areas and open lines of communication by conducting operations in the countryside. As a result of Gen Thang's leadership and his program of offensive action, the situation in the Delta is said to have improved somewhat in the past few weeks.

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Possible New NVA Artillery Regiments in South Vietnam

North Vietnam may be strengthening its artillery capabilities in South Vietnam.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

a regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) artillery regiment, possibly the 45th, may have entered the country and may now be near Route 547 in the A Shau Valley. Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Sec. 3.3(b) (1) a large amount of ammunition being stored at Kilometer Marker 31 on Route 547. The 45th Artillery Regiment, a subordinate of the 351st Artillery Command, has been carried at Son Tay in North Vietnam for several years.

Several prisoners claim that the 208th NVA Artillery Regiment is in southern Binh Duong Province. ~~SECRET~~ Sec. 3.3(b)







Vietnamese Communist Use of Cambodian Territory

A recent rallier in South Vietnam has described one method by which the Vietnamese Communists allegedly obtained supplies in Cambodia during 1967. Although he claims that the operations were condoned by the Cambodian Government, it may be that only local military commanders trying to supplement their meager income were involved.

An "86th NVA Regiment" in Cambodia had the mission of procuring rice there and transporting it to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, according to the rallier. The regiment's commander was said to have bought the rice in Phnom Penh, where he arranged to have it trucked to a point near a storage site off Route 14. Troops of the regiment's 2d battalion then took the grain to an area about three kilometers from the South Vietnamese frontier, whence it was carried to a receiving unit at the border; about 10 tons of milled rice was reportedly moved monthly into South Vietnam in this way.

The 86th Regiment had allegedly been guaranteed the right to control the supply route and bivouac area near the border and Cambodian forces were ordered to stay away. Cambodian patrols did enter occasionally, however, and in May 1967, one engaged in a firefight with a Viet Cong security detachment; three Cambodians were reportedly killed and four wounded. When it complained to the provincial chief, the regiment was supposedly informed that the Cambodian troops would henceforth remain outside the Communist-controlled area.

Many reports of the transfer of supplies by Cambodian military vehicles to Communist supply areas along the border have been received, and COMUSMACV carries an "86th Viet Cong rear services group" with an estimated 1,000 men near the border in South Vietnam's Phuoc Long Province. Smuggling operations reportedly became more difficult after Sihanouk ordered them stopped in late January. The matter was also brought to the attention of the Viet Cong representative in Phnom Penh on 23 February.

~~(SECRET)~~

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Hanoi Again Rejects the San Antonio Formula

Hanoi has twice again categorically rejected President Johnson's San Antonio formula for negotiations.

Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh recently set forth North Vietnam's hard-line position to Norwegian Ambassador to Peiping Allgaard. When Allgaard pointed out that the US proposal was designed to avoid another Panmunjon, Trinh replied: "We fight honestly and we negotiate honestly." The Ambassador was impressed with the "self-confidence and openness" of North Vietnamese authorities and felt that his invitation was a part of Hanoi's campaign to influence Scandinavian officials.

Hanoi also denounced the San Antonio formula to a visiting high-level French Communist Party delegation. A joint communique signed on 11 March stated that although Washington said it wanted to open conversations with Hanoi, it had refused to reply to North Vietnam's declarations of willingness to talk once the bombings had been stopped. According to the communique, this proved that American statements were only "lies" intended to mask an intensification of the war. The document further asserted that this was precisely why so many governments and international public opinion approved the North Vietnamese position. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~





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Elements of 316th NVA Division May Be in Northern Laos

Major elements of the 316th NVA Division may have deployed to northern Laos where they had operated during the early 1960s.

~~Sec. 3.3(b) (1)~~ elements of the 316th Division moved out of North Vietnam in late January or early February. ~~Sec. 3.3(b) (1)~~ placed its 174th and 148th Infantry Regiments and separate 4th Battalion in northern Laos as of late January. The division's last confirmed location was in the Moc Chau area of North Vietnam near the Lao border.

A sizable increase in North Vietnamese forces in Laos since early 1967 has been indicated by the expansion of the NVA operational network there from 60 radio stations at that time to about 130. Most terminals are in the northern region and subordinate to or associated with the Headquarters of North Vietnam's neighboring Military Region (MR) Northwest. During the 1961-1962 period of NVA offensive operations in Laos, Hq, MR Northwest, acted as communications control. ~~(SECRET)~~ ~~Sec. 3.3(b)~~

Communists Plan Pro-North Vietnam Rally in Uruguay

Communist groups planning a pro-North Vietnam rally on 26 March will probably carry out "lightning" demonstrations before US business and government offices in Montevideo.

The groups plan to show "atrocities" films from Vietnam and will solicit funds to purchase bicycles and medicine for North Vietnam. Although not directly associated, the Communist-dominated National Labor Confederation has reaffirmed its solidarity with Hanoi as a part of its "battle plan" against the government's belt-tightening economic policies. Uruguayan security forces have been alerted.

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
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# **SUPPLEMENT**

## **CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN** **NORTH VIETNAM**



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## CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN NORTH VIETNAM

### Introduction

The 30,000-50,000 Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam represent the largest direct manpower commitment of any Communist country supporting Hanoi. The Chinese have undoubtedly made this commitment not only to support the war effort but also to maintain their military and political influence on North Vietnam's leaders in the face of the greater material assistance provided by the USSR. Peiping probably also hopes to "prove" that it, not Moscow, leads the world in resisting "US imperialism" and in advancing the Communist cause.

### Chinese Communist Doctrine

The Chinese Communists obviously feel that the Vietnamese War is the "proving ground" for their doctrine that backing "People's Wars of National Liberation" is the principal means by which they can extend their influence into developing nations, particularly those in Southeast Asia. Providing political and material support to insurgent groups in the "victim" country without committing ground combat troops offers a relatively cheap, low-risk, and flexible way to expand Chinese influence.

The conflict in South Vietnam began as a Communist-inspired insurgency -- a model "people's war." As the war progressed, the need for additional assistance to North Vietnam grew, and China, in turn, was called upon to increase its support. This took the form of stepped-up shipments and the sending of Chinese military personnel. The latter represent something of a diversion from the "people's war" doctrine, but the main thesis is retained because China is providing primarily materiel, while the natives fight the battles.

### Sources of Information

Sec. 3.3(b) (1) basis for assessments of the nature and extent of Chinese involvement in North Vietnam. Aerial photographs and other collateral reports have substantiated the

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424; Sec. 3.3(b) (1)



Makeup of Chinese Forces in North Vietnam

The senior Chinese Communist communications authority in North Vietnam is probably colocated with the Chinese Embassy. The headquarters involved communicates with four construction/military support elements, four major antiaircraft artillery units, and the Kunming Military Region. This force also includes technicians, advisers, and air surveillance components.

Logistic/Construction-Related Advisory Elements

A major phase of Chinese Communist activity in North Vietnam is the logistic and construction support effort in the northwest and northeast areas

Sec. 3.3(b) (8); Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Sec 3.3(b) (2) A fifth one, however, in the Cao Bang vicinity evidently underwent an extensive change in late 1967 and may have returned to China or moved elsewhere in North Vietnam. Sec. 3.3(b) (8)

Sec. 3.3(b) (8); Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

Of the construction-related elements, the 2d Railway



Engineer Division near Kep is the most firmly identified. It may not be at full TO&E strength, slightly in excess of 11,000, since [Sec. 3.3(b) (2)]

[Sec. 3.3(b) (1)] If one of its regiments remained behind, the division strength in North Vietnam would approximate 7,000 men. Two of the other three construction-type units are in the Lao Cai area and one is near Hanoi. If they are organized in a manner roughly comparable to an Independent Engineer Regiment -- some similarity of function seems apparent -- they probably each have some 2,000 personnel.

The possibility exists that all four of these construction-type units may be employing only a cadre force to supervise unskilled and semiskilled Chinese or Vietnamese laborers. Employment of Vietnamese labor by Chinese units appears unlikely considering historical Chinese-Vietnamese animosities, the language barrier, and suggestions in some reports that the Chinese are generally segregated. It seems more likely that civilian Chinese laborers may be attached to these units for support duties.

A Chinese presence [Sec. 3.3(b) (1)]

[Sec. 3.3(b) (1)] may be associated with construction there, but insufficient data preclude association of a troop strength with this unit. A recent series of reports, [Sec. 3.3(b) (1)]

[Sec. 3.3(b) (1)] cites the presence of exceedingly large numbers of laborers in North Vietnam; this information suggests that China may have sent in a labor corps. Although undoubtedly exaggerated, they could eventually become a basis for enlarging the currently estimated 30,000-50,000 strength.

Some 4,000-11,000 technicians and advisers are also believed present in addition to 26,000-39,000 troops, making a total estimated Chinese military presence of 30,000-50,000.

### AAA Units

Most recent Chinese Communist AAA deployments involved the introduction of the 104th and 111th CCAF AAA Divisions. The 111th was deployed from China in January to replace the 105th located at Lang



Son; the 104th apparently began a deployment from Ningming in early March and appears destined to replace the 110th in the Hanoi area which has completed the usual six- to eight-month tour in North Vietnam. The size of the AAA units present may vary considerably since organizational flexibility is characteristic of antiaircraft artillery elements. The four AAA Divisions are believed to have a total of 12,000-20,000 troops.

#### Air Surveillance Sites

An air surveillance site is located at Dien Bien Phu, Yen Bai, Lai Chau, and two are on the northeast coast. Three of them operate KNIFE REST B early warning radars; the equipment at Lai Chau and at one site in the northeast has not been identified. The Chinese Communist air defense sector headquarters near Mengtzu in the Kunming Air Defense District is known to control the sites at Dien Bien Phu, Yen Bai, and Lai Chau; the two on the northeast coast are under the operational control of an unidentified facility in the Lang Son-Ningming area.

#### Deployment of Chinese Forces

Except for the AAA element reported in Nam Dinh and units at Thai Nguyen and coastal points, the Chinese forces are generally deployed along the two main rail lines north of Hanoi. The bulk of those in the northeast are along the rail line between Hanoi and Lang Son; in the northwest, they are along the Hanoi-Lao Cai link. These alignments have apparently been effected to facilitate the movement of weapons, equipment, and supplies into North Vietnam, at least as far south as Hanoi, and to help the Vietnamese maintain and operate lines of communication.

The main function of the Chinese AAA is the protection from US air strikes of these lines of communication and the supplies moving along them. The Chinese Communist AAA units in North Vietnam receive administrative instructions and some operational direction from the headquarters of the Canton and Kunming Military Regions. In addition, close communication between the CCAF AAA units in North Vietnam and Hq, 7th Air Army, in Nanning has been observed.

Capabilities

Chinese Communist forces in North Vietnam are capable of helping the Vietnamese repair and rehabilitate war-damaged roads and railroads, undertake new construction, and distribute materiel and supplies received from China. The AAA units not only protect Chinese activities, they also reinforce North Vietnam's air defense establishment. The rather extensive communications network and the logistic structure that have been established provide the organizational framework for the introduction of Chinese ground combat units -- if the Communists decide upon such a course of action. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~

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